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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The water explodes, boiling and bubbling, as a great behemoth shatters its 
calm surface.  The giant tarpon roars from the abyss, shaking its head in 
defiance at the audacity of a red-faced, adrenaline-ridden fisherman.  The 
leviathan’s powerful tail skates across the top of the water, its body thrashing 
wildly before crashing back into what had just moments before been a 
beautifully translucent, emerald ocean.  Who would dare hook an 
intimidating giant such as this?  After a few more head shaking jumps, 
furious runs, and deep dives, the long battle ends with a cold stare from 
prehistoric, unblinking eyes.  The hook is pulled out, and the mighty game 
fish swims off into the sea, warier of the next meal that floats by its open 
maw.  
Tarpon are prized game fish.1  A “game fish” is a fish that anglers pursue 
primarily for the sporting thrill of the catch.2  The awe-inspiring acrobatics 
and sheer ferocity with which tarpon battle those wily enough to entice a bite 
from the fish’s powerful jaws intoxicates anglers across the globe.3  The 
excitement generated from managing to hook these powerful fish tempts 
many an angler to spend all of his or her spare time carefully constructing 
different machinations that may outsmart these beautiful creatures.4 
Tarpon also migrate.5  The fish travel throughout the warm waters of the 
Caribbean off the coasts of Central America and the southeastern United 
States.6  Therein lies the problem affecting the long-term viability of the 
species.  Actions that destroy juvenile tarpon habitat or kill adult tarpon in 
one portion of the fish’s range will ripple throughout the entirety of states 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Tarpon, INTERNATIONAL GAME FISH ASSOCIATION, https://igfa.org/species/238-tarpon. 
aspx?CommonName=238-tarpon.aspx (describing tarpon as “one of the first saltwater species 
to be declared a game fish”). 
 2 Jerry Gibbs, Tarpon: The Greatest Game Fish, OUTDOOR LIFE, Sept. 2007, http://www. 
outdoorlife.com/articles/fishing/2007/09/tarpon-greatest-game-fish (comparing the thrill of 
catching a tarpon to riding a roller coaster, since the first thought in each situation is, “My 
God, what have I done?”). 
 3 Id. (listing the Florida Keys, Louisiana, and Costa Rica as locations where anglers fish 
for tarpon). 
 4 See My Tarpon Addiction, FIELD AND STREAM, May 2005, http://www.fieldandstream.com/ 
articles/fishing/saltwater/2005/05/my-tarpon-addiction (discussing one angler’s determination to 
find and catch tarpon as a generalization of tarpon fishing). 
 5 A. Adams et al., Megalops atlanticus, in THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES 
(Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature & Natural Res., ed., 2012), http://www.iucnredlist. 
org/details/191823/0. 
 6 Id. 
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along the migration pattern.7  Traditional attempts to address this problem 
have largely been unsuccessful.8  Further, the lack of rebound in tarpon 
populations suggests current efforts have not provided adequate protection 
for the species.9  On the other hand, international agreements addressing 
transboundary waters seem to have proven successful in addressing problems 
concerning the maintenance of adequate flows for international rivers.10  
Since tarpon migrations are similar to the flow of an international river, the 
same framework could potentially be implemented to sustainably manage 
tarpon population. 
This Note suggests a regime capable of adequately protecting tarpon.  
That system will be formed by comparing traditional water rights regimes 
like those governing transboundary flows of water with the movement of 
migratory fish populations such as tarpon.  This analogy encourages the 
creation of duties that would require upstream states in a migratory pattern to 
sustainably manage migratory fish populations; thereby avoiding harm to 
downstream states, and providing for the future of the migratory population.  
In other words, just as upstream states owe a duty to preserve certain levels 
of water to flow to downstream states, a similar duty may be imposed to 
preserve flows of a different kind of natural resource—namely, the migratory 
fish that populate those states’ shared waters.  Ultimately, this Note seeks to 
determine whether a duty to conserve migratory fish populations, or at least 
to manage said populations sustainably, may be imposed in international 
riparian rights systems. 
Part II of this Note begins by outlining the unique biology of tarpon that 
both inspires their protection and compromises the long-term health of the 
species.  Part III frames the problem that regulating tarpon poses by outlining 
                                                                                                                   
 7 See Kirk Deeter, Tarpon Tagging Key to Understanding Silver Kings, FIELD AND 
STREAM, Sept. 2015, http://www.fieldandstream.com/blogs/flytalk/tarpon-tagging-key-to-und 
erstanding-silver-kings (explaining that when an individual spears a tarpon in one area, he or 
she is “really impacting fisheries many miles away”). 
 8 David Sikes, Catch Me If You Can, TEXAS PARKS & WILDLIFE MAGAZINE, June 2011, 
http://www.tpwmagazine.com/archive/2011/jun/ed_2/index.phtml (contrasting current efforts 
to increase the tarpon population with post conservation effects on tarpon populations). 
 9 Id. (noting a general decline in tarpon populations off of the coast of Texas and 
discussing calls for “a uniform regulation plan and development of an international 
management strategy” that goes beyond previous conservation efforts). 
 10 Transboundary Waters, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/transbo 
undary_waters.shtml.  See, e.g., Trans-Boundary Agreements, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF 
TECHNOLOGY, http://12.000.scripts.mit.edu/mission2017trans-boundary-agreements/ (describing 
the successful allocation of water from the Orange River between Lesotho and South Africa’s 
international agreement). 
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classic remedies to these general problems, describing the current state of 
affairs, and explaining why current efforts are not providing adequate 
protection for the overall health of the tarpon population.  Part IV of this 
Note attempts to re-focus the legal problem by analyzing mechanisms that 
already exist in similar contexts where problems regulating a resource span 
international boundaries—international water use agreements.  Part IV then 
argues for the creation of a system that effectively manages migratory fish 
populations in the same manner that existing international riparian rights are 
preserved.  In essence, through analogizing international flows of one 
profoundly important resource—water—with flows of another resource—
tarpon—this Note argues that upstream states in migration patterns should 
owe duties to preserve certain rates of flow of migratory fish to downstream 
states. 
II.  MEET THE SILVER KING 
Tarpon are colloquially described as the “Silver King,” which refers to the 
tarpon’s silvery color and impressive size.11  To describe tarpon as merely an 
impressive fish is an exercise in understatement.12  These fish can approach, 
sometimes even exceed, eight feet in length, and have been measured 
upwards of two hundred and eighty pounds in weight.13  Tarpon are also a 
highly migratory fish species.14  These fish can normally be found moving 
throughout the Gulf of Mexico between Central America and the United 
States.15  As a species, however, tarpon are distributed along the eastern 
coast of the United States, throughout the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, and 
down the eastern coast of Central and South America.16  Usually these fish 
                                                                                                                   
 11 Tarpon Facts, FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, http://myfwc. 
com/research/saltwater/tarpon/information/facts/; Tarpon: Silver King of the Coast, SEA 
STATS (Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, St. Petersburg, Fla.), Dec. 2011, at 1, 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/3459 5046/Sea-Stats-Tarpon?in_collection=2498616. 
 12 Tarpon Facts, supra note 11 (noting that because of its strength, stamina, and fighting 
ability, many revere the tarpon as one of Florida’s premier game fish).  See, e.g., Tarpon Tale, 
FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, http://myfwc.com/research/salt 
water/tarpon/information/tarpon-tale/ (telling a story of catching a tarpon that, once hooked, 
jumped across the bow of a boat, clearing it by as much as three feet, while being chased by a 
nine-foot bull shark). 
 13 Tarpon: Silver King of the Coast, supra note 11, at 1. 
 14 Adams et al., supra note 5. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
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roam no more than about one hundred and fifty five miles from shore.17  As 
they travel through the Gulf of Mexico, no recorded tarpon has taken a direct 
path from Mexico to Florida; instead the fish typically travel through the 
waters of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas before making their 
way into Central America—reinforcing the belief that tarpon prefer the 
warmer waters closer to shore.18 
Tarpon do not spend their entire lives in these warm, near-shore waters.  
Tarpon spawn offshore.19  Upon fertilization, the larval stage tarpon, called a 
leptocaphalus, swims into an estuary.20  Estuaries are bodies of water where 
fresh water mixes with and dilutes salt water, often the point where a river 
meets the sea.21  After a month, the leptocaphalus develops into a juvenile, 
and continues its journey to adulthood in the mosquito-infested, back-bay 
creeks of protected mangrove estuaries and wetlands.22  These estuarine 
environments typically have low dissolved oxygen content, which helps 
protect juvenile tarpon from predators.23  Juvenile tarpon are able to survive 
in these low oxygen content waters because of their unique ability to obtain 
air from the surface rather than the water.24 
Tarpon also have a long life span,25 which adds to the allure of attempting 
to catch these magnificent creatures.  Because these fish live to such old 
ages, they seem at times to evade the efforts of all except the craftiest angler.  
While tarpon can live as long as thirty years, tarpon mature relatively slowly, 
reaching sexual maturity around ten years of age.26 
Tarpon are desirable game fish not only due to their unique proclivity for 
testing an angler’s skill, but because these fish seem to prefer waters where 
anglers can watch every step of the drama unfold before their eyes.  Adult 
tarpon typically inhabit the relatively shallow water closer to shore.27  When 
tarpon travel through shallow waters along coastal flats, they are easier to 
                                                                                                                   
 17 Id. 
 18 Telephone Interview with Dr. Aaron Adams, Director, Bonefish & Tarpon Trust (Oct. 
16, 2014).  
 19 A Summary of the Tarpon Life Cycle, BONEFISH & TARPON TR., http://www.bonefishtar 
pontrust.org/terms-of-use/a-summary-of-the-tarpon-life-cycle.html. 
 20 Id. 
 21 16 U.S.C. § 1453(7) (2012). 
 22 A Summary of the Tarpon Life Cycle, supra note 19. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Tarpon: Silver King of the Coast, supra note 11, at 1. 
 26 Id. at 1, 3. 
 27 Adams et al., supra note 5. 
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“sight fish”—that is, an angler can spot the fish before casting.  Their 
preference for warm, shallow water, along with the unique behaviors of 
tarpon28—like their ability to gulp air at the water’s surface—allow anglers 
to more easily detect the fish’s presence.  The angler can then carefully 
watch the movement of the fish, and attempt to beguile the fish into eating an 
artificial, or sometimes baited, lure.  The combination of all these 
characteristics makes tarpon an exciting challenge for recreational fishermen.   
Individuals often spend large portions of their income to pursue these 
monstrous trophy fish, which has helped to grow a burgeoning sport-fishing 
industry.29  While visiting Gulf Coast towns, anglers hire guides, rent hotels, 
and visit retail shops.30  The proximity of towns to waters frequented by 
tarpon and other gamefish supports entire communities.31  As the fish are 
drawn towards bait, excited fishermen are attracted to the prospective bite of 
a dream come true—hooking up with a giant.  The recreational fishing 
industry that has grown around these magnificent fish generates more than 
$6 billion per year for coastal states in the United States alone.32  Tarpon are 
therefore a valuable contributor to regional economies purely for recreational 
purposes. 
Tarpon are not harvested commercially in the United States.33  These fish 
are extremely bony and very muscular.34  This biological structure renders 
                                                                                                                   
 28 James Green, Tarpon, Breathing Air and Making Daisy Chains, DROWNING WORMS (June 
12, 2014), http://drowningworms.com/tarpon-breathing-air-making-daisy-chains/ (describing 
behaviors like “daisy chaining,” which is a “colloquial name for when a group of fish bump, rub 
against, and follow each other around in a constant circle or wheel”). 
 29 Rusty Fly Charters, HAWKS CAY RESORT, https://www.hawkscay.com/experience/flori 
da-keys-fishing-charters/rusty-fly-charters (listing the price of a guide for one full day of 
tarpon fishing at $750). 
 30 See A Typical Day of Tarpon Fishing, GREAT ALASKA, http://www.greatalaska.com/ 
pages/_a_typical_day_of_tarpon_fishing/199.php (describing a typical tarpon fishing trip). 
 31 See, e.g., Anthony J. Fedler & Craig Hayes, Economic Impact of Recreational Fishing 
for Bonefish, Permit and Tarpon in Belize for 2007 (Apr. 2008), http://www.nautilusreels. 
com/app/webroot/userfiles/66/bpt%20economic%20report%20-%20final2.pdf (describing the 
impact that guided fishing trips from both lodges and independent guides have on local 
economies in Belize); Tony Fedler, Economic Impact of the Florida Keys Flats Fishery, 
BONEFISH & TARPON TRUST (May 29, 2013), http://lkga.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ 
BTT-Keys-Economic-Report.pdf (detailing the specific regional impact of sport fishing on 
communities in the Florida Keys). 
 32 Tarpon Federal Gamefish Initiative, FLA. FLY FISHING MAG., Mar. 2012, at 41. 
 33 Adams et al., supra note 5 (describing the use and trade of tarpon). 
 34 Jeff Dennis, Tarpon Report for the Coastal Lowcountry, THE COLLETONIAN, Sept. 26, 
2012, http://thecolletonian.com/tarpon-report-for-the-coastal-lowcountry/. 
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tarpon undesirable for most consumers.35  However, the lack of a large 
commercial fishery to process tarpon does not mean the fish are not routinely 
killed in some parts of the country for sport.36  Similarly, throughout Central 
and South America, local fishermen and women regularly harvest tarpon.37  
Tarpon and their eggs are also consumed in Central and South American 
countries.38  
III.  DECLINING TARPON STOCKS POSE A PROBLEM 
Tarpon currently face several challenges including, chiefly, 
overharvesting of the species.39  Tarpon are occasionally killed recreationally 
in the United States.40  For instance, certain tarpon fishing tournaments are 
held every year and often result in the death of tarpon.41  Of greater concern 
to the continued existence of the species is their repeated harvest outside of 
the United States’ territorial waters.  Tarpon are often taken as incidental 
catch by long-lines and gill nets in both the broader Caribbean and Mexico 
and sold commercially.42  
An additional and related concern with overharvesting these fish is the 
likelihood of catch-and-release mortality. Improper angling etiquette 
produces a strong negative impact on the health of the fishery.43  For 
example, shark attacks are a more common cause of mortality for tarpon 
after they are successfully landed and released on extremely light tackle 
because the tarpon are exhausted.44  Likewise, in the recent past, Floridian 
                                                                                                                   
 35 Id. 
 36 See Pete McDonald, Tarpon: Spearfishing? Seriously?, FISHING JONES (Mar. 12, 2008), 
http://fishingjones.com/2008/03/12/tarpon-spearfishing/ (reporting on spearfishing tournaments 
for tarpon).  See also 2008 Fish Pics, HELL DIVERS SPEARFISHING CLUB http://helldivers.org/pics/ 
2008/fish_pics.php (showing tarpon killed while spearfishing in pictures 28, 62, 63, 86, and 
possibly 88). 
 37 See Scott Alford, 73 Texas Tarpon Killed in May!!, HOUSTON CHRON. (June 25, 2007, 
11:59 AM), http://blog.chron.com/outdoorseasons/2007/06/73-texas-tarpon-killed-in-may/ 
(describing a “kill tournament” in Mexico where anglers focused on harvesting tarpon for a 
monetary prize). 
 38 Tarpon: Silver King of the Coast, supra note 11, at 3. 
 39 Adams et al., supra note 5. 
 40 McDonald, supra note 36. 
 41 Alford, supra note 37. 
 42 Adams et al., supra note 5. 
 43 Telephone Interview with Dr. Aaron Adams, supra note 18. 
 44 FISH & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMM’N, Summary Report on the Catch-and-Release 
Mortality Study on Tarpon in Boca Grande Pass, 2002–2004, at 4 (2013), http://myfwc.com/ 
media/2646572/2002-2004-report-updated.pdf. 
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anglers would “snag” a tarpon by hooking it outside of its mouth rather than 
hooking the fish in the corner of the mouth as is customarily practiced.  Such 
practices resulted in much higher mortality rates for caught tarpon.45  This 
led to Florida prohibiting the use of certain jigs that snagged tarpon instead 
of hooking them properly.46  
The consumptive element of the tarpon fishery is not the only problem 
facing these fish.  Habitat destruction and the alteration of freshwater flows 
into estuaries where juveniles develop all pose significant problems to the 
fishery.47  According to Dr. Aaron Adams, director of the Bonefish and 
Tarpon Trust, one of the largest threats to the long-term sustainability of the 
United States’ fishery is the destruction and alteration of habitat for juvenile 
tarpon.48  The most serious forms of habitat destruction are the diversion of 
fresh water from mangrove and marsh areas, filling in mangrove wetlands 
and salt marshes for development, cutting down mangroves for wood 
products, and pollution.49  
Juvenile tarpon require specific environmental conditions that foster a 
safe development into adulthood.50  Altering freshwater flows into the 
estuarine environments where juvenile tarpon develop imperils both the 
health of tarpon populations and that fragile habitat.51  For instance, if 
freshwater is continually released into estuaries for a sustained period of 
time, certain sea grasses will die due to an alteration of water salinity 
levels.52  This begins a chain reaction, as the organisms that rely on sea grass 
habitats will also be forced to leave the area or potentially die.53  In turn, 
                                                                                                                   
 45 Randy Wayne White, Fishing’s Dirty Little Secret: Critics Say Tarpon Actually Are 
Snagged With This Popular Style of Boca Grande Pass Fishing, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 14, 2013, 
http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/fishings-dirty-little-secret--critics-say-tarpon-act 
ually-are--snagged-with-this--popular-style-of--boca-grande-pass--fishing-b82477710z1. 
 46 FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 68B-32.006 (2013). 
 47 Telephone Interview with Dr. Aaron Adams, supra note 18 (listing mangrove 
destruction, pollution/destruction of estuaries, anglers “snagging” tarpon rather than hooking 
them, the use of “circle” hooks instead of “j” hooks, and gill netting practices as destructive 
elements of the fishery).  
 48 Adams et al., supra note 5. 
 49 Juvenile Tarpon Habitat Initiative, BONEFISH & TARPON TR., http://www.bonefishtarpon 
trust.org/juvenile-tarpon-habitat-program/juvenile-tarpon-habitat-program.html; Habitat 
Conservation, BONEFISH & TARPON TR., https://www.bonefishtarpon trust.org/habitat-conserv 
ation.html. 
 50 Habitat Conservation, supra note 49. 
 51 Telephone Interview with Dr. Aaron Adams, supra note 18. 
 52 Habitat Conservation, supra note 49. 
 53 Id. 
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fewer game fish will inhabit these areas due to a diminished food supply and 
the absence of an area to safely avoid the presence of predators.  The same 
scenario would likely apply to mangrove habitats as well: by altering the 
basic components of an ecosystem, more complex organisms may be unable 
to survive.54  While these important, foundational species may be able to live 
in environments with higher levels of freshwater temporarily, they will likely 
succumb to competition by other plant species if the system changes to a 
largely freshwater environment.55  This reaction results in the loss of habitat 
available to juvenile tarpon.56  Altering these important juvenile fish habitats 
invites disaster for coastal game fish because the adult tarpon population 
cannot grow or even exist if juveniles disappear.57  
Threats to tarpon populations are therefore exacerbated by the tarpon’s 
biology and life cycle.  Since juvenile tarpon require specific habitats to 
grow and develop, habitat protection is crucial to protecting the health of the 
entire population, especially when considering the slow growth rate of 
tarpon.58  Moreover, assuming natural reproduction rates, the destruction of 
juvenile tarpon habitats, or the harvest of juvenile fish, could have drastically 
negative effects on future levels of the population because the stock will not 
replenish itself quickly since tarpon require ten years to reach sexual 
maturity.59  Tarpon therefore are unable to respond to shocks in population 
levels quickly.  Thus, the destruction of juvenile habitat coupled with 
excessive harvest of mature tarpon could effectively cripple local populations 
of tarpon.  This in turn may lead to a decrease in the numbers of tarpon that 
follow traditional migration patterns. 
A.  Classic Remedies to the Problems Tarpon Create 
Economists have long recognized the inherent difficulties of sustainably 
managing a public resource like tarpon.  This is generally categorized as a 
collective action problem and, more specifically, labeled as a tragedy of the 
commons.  However, there are more elements to the problem than just 
managing a fishery in one discrete location.  Tarpon migrate significant 
                                                                                                                   
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 A Summary of the Tarpon Life Cycle, supra note 19 (noting tarpon live upwards of eighty 
years). 
 59 Id. 
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distances across international borders.  Thus, the harms inflicted by the 
tragedy of the commons have international ramifications.  International law 
has developed important principles to attempt to minimize the effects of 
cross-border, or transboundary, harms.  The following sections outline the 
typical remedies to problems posed by efforts to sustainably manage tarpon. 
1.  Tragedy of the Commons/Collective Action Problem 
Economists conventionally lump fisheries management into a type of 
collective action problem known as a “tragedy of the commons.”60  Typically 
a tragedy of the commons arises when rational consumers of a public 
resource face no incentive to align their use with the long-term interests of 
the community.61  In other words, each rational user of the commons seeks to 
gather as much of the resource as they can, without regard to the overall 
management of the resource.62  Other users of the commons harvest any 
resource another user voluntarily refrains from exploiting, as the commons 
are open to all.63  The end result is the total consumption of the commons, 
since no rational actor would voluntarily cease exploiting the shared 
resource.64 
  a.  Solutions to a Tragedy of the Commons Problem 
To combat a typical tragedy of the commons, classical economic analysis 
has developed four basic solutions.  First, the commons may be divided up, 
and individuals may be given private property rights to a section of the 
commons.65  Creating a private property right should effectively incentivize 
individuals to use the commons sustainably.66  For their portion of the 
commons to remain productive, these individuals can no longer extract the 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Rouba Al-Fattal, The Tragedy of the Commons: Institutions and Fisheries Management 
at the Local and EU Levels, 21 REV. POL. ECON. 4, 537–47 (2009). 
 61 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243–48 (1968). 
 62 Id. at 1244. 
 63 Id.  
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 1245. 
 66 See Jonathan H. Adler, Property Rights and the Tragedy of the Commons, THE 
ATLANTIC, May 22, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/05/property-right 
s-and-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/257549/. 
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benefits of the resource without crafting a plan to replenish it.67  This method 
internalizes the externalities, making individual actors account for the costs 
of their actions, and hopefully prompts those actors to take effective 
measures to ensure the long-term health of their portion of the commons.68  
An example of a regime that created property rights in order to better 
manage a fishery is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).69  UNCLOS created five categorical zones based on the distance 
from a nation’s shores in nautical miles and allocated different property 
rights to the resources found within each zone, including rights to manage 
the fisheries located in those waters.  The drafters and signees hoped that 
UNCLOS would increase coastal states’ abilities to manage fisheries 
responsibly.70  
However, results under this regime have been disappointing to say the 
least.71  Creating property rights, specifically by designating territories that 
may be fished among nations, has facilitated unprecedented exploitation.72  
Property rights incentivized states to subsidize their commercial fishing 
operations to encourage the development of domestic fishing industries.73  
The robust growth of domestic fishing activities in turn led to dramatic 
increases in overfishing.74  The exclusive right to access fish in given 
stretches of waters, coupled with greater access to technology, incentivized 
and activated domestic commercial fishermen.  These modern operations 
more closely resemble floating vacuum cleaners than traditional hook-and-
line fishing.75  Because the creation and implementation of property rights in 
the context of international fisheries seems to have furthered problems 
related to overfishing, the creation of property rights alone is not an effective 
solution to the problem of sustainably managing migratory fish.76 
                                                                                                                   
 67 Id. (noting that the creation of well-defined and secure property rights incentives 
individuals to “car[e] for the underlying resource and prevent[ ] its overuse”). 
 68 Id. 
 69 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 70 DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND POLICY 763 (4th ed. 2011) (“Thus when the exclusive economic zones were created in 
UNCLOS, placing 90% of the world’s fish catch within national jurisdictions, it was thought that 
this would encourage strict national oversight to ensure conservation of domestic fish stocks.”). 
 71 Id. at 763–64. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 761–64. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. at 1047–68. 
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Another potential remedy to the tragedy of the commons would be to 
increase the size of the commons.  By increasing the commons’ size, the 
immediate degradation is not realized as quickly.  If the size of the commons 
can be continually increased, then its destruction can be effectively 
postponed.  While this is paradoxical to explain, because in reality resources 
are finite, there may be some measure of applicability in the context of 
fisheries management.  For instance, if tarpon were raised in commercial 
hatcheries and subsequently released into the wild, the overall stock of 
tarpon could theoretically be increased indefinitely.  
For example, aquaculture, has been one of the fastest growing industries 
in recent years, outpacing the growth of traditional food sources.77  While 
aquaculture has been effective in growing food sources, it remains to be seen 
if aquaculture could be an effective technique for increasing the populations 
of game fish.78 
The final two remedies to a tragedy of the commons are different 
techniques for implementing the same strategy.  The third solution limits the 
effects of self-interest by establishing rules as social norms that seek to 
exclude and govern the commons.79  This solution targets the lack of 
enforcement ability for shared resources.80  In the international context, these 
types of solutions merit substantial attention.81  
                                                                                                                   
 77 See generally FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UK, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND 
AQUACULTURE (2014), available at http://www.fao.org/3/d1eaa9a1-5a71-Ac42-86cO-f211f0 
7de16/i3720e.pdf (explaining the state of aquaculture and the outlook for the future of 
aquaculture around the world). 
 78 See SCDNR Makes Huge Redfish Stocking in Chechessee River, S.C. SPORTSMAN, Dec. 
12, 2013, http://www.southcarolinasportsman.com/details.php?id=3460 (describing efforts of 
the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources to increase the population levels of 
redfish, a recognized game fish in the state of South Carolina, via fish hatched from wild-
caught redfish). See also Zach Murdock, State Scientists to Stock Chechessee River with 
100,000 Red Drum, THE STATE, Dec. 8, 2013, http://www.thestate.com/lastest-news/article/ 
3831244.html (detailing further the restocking efforts of the South Carolina Department of 
Natural Resources for redfish). 
 79 See generally Flavio Felice & Massimiliano Vatiero, Elinor Ostrom and the Solution to the 
Tragedy of the Commons, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (June 27, 2012), http://www.aei. 
org/publication/elinor-ostrom-and-the-solution-to-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/ (explaining that 
shared societal norms developed from the largest, most basic unit of society and progressing 
upwards to governance and legal rules can effectively solve the problem that is the tragedy of the 
commons). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. (describing specific communities in Japan, Spain, the Philippines, and Italy where 
rules for public planning resulted from bottom up to assure sustainability of common 
resources). 
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Alternatively, the fourth and final solution requires shaping legal rules to 
encourage a cooperative environment.  This can be accomplished by 
allowing locally shared traditions to govern.82  Traditions can have the effect 
of more formal enforcement provisions, but are by nature not actual rules.83  
By incorporating these norms into legislation, the regulator can provide teeth 
to previously unenforceable standards. 
For instance, the Maori people of the Pacific Islands represent a unique 
example of how standards can be developed to reflect societal norms.  The 
Maori people created a property regime, te tikanga o te moana, that 
addresses the tragedy of the commons by incorporating the Maori beliefs 
regarding the ocean.84  The Maori property regime combines a shared set of 
norms among its people that sets standards far above simply maintaining 
levels of fish.85  Instead, the Maori property regime recognizes that the best 
interests of the collective community revolve around sustainably managing 
the harvesting of resources.86 
2.  International Law’s Treatment of Transboundary Harms 
Since tarpon flow, or migrate, across international boundaries, the 
consequences of deciding whether to regulate the fishery can be considered a 
type of transboundary harm; specifically, a transboundary harm to a natural 
resource.  The effect of pollutants as a transboundary harm to natural 
resources was the subject of the Trail Smelter Arbitration, which concerned a 
dispute between United States apple growers and a Canadian smelting 
plant.87  In Trail Smelter, a Canadian smelting plant generated transboundary 
pollutants that negatively affected apple growers’ crops in the United 
States.88 The arbitrator held that the Canadian smelter was liable for the 
injuries to trees, soil, and crop yield suffered by the United States apple 
farmers resulting from the smelter’s emission of sulfur dioxide.89  The Trail 
Smelter Arbitration is therefore a seminal case in the development of 
                                                                                                                   
 82 Id. (explaining that when conflict resolution measures are local and public, a mutual 
control of the resource among the users themselves may be established which facilitates its 
proper management). 
 83 Id. 
 84 HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 70, at 754–55. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id.  
 87 Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941). 
 88 Id.  
 89 Id.  
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international environmental law because it laid the foundation for the “no 
harm” rule when addressing transboundary harms.90  One way to consider 
this problem is to evaluate the management of a fishery across political 
borders as transboundary harm.  It seems to follow, under the principles of 
Trail Smelter, that one state may owe a duty to another to do no harm to that 
fishery.  However, the realities of the situation do not mesh quite as neatly 
into such an outcome.  Unlike Trail Smelter, where pollutants traversed 
international borders to cause tangible harms to fixed resources, if fish that 
typically migrate from one country’s coastal waters to another are harvested 
in the upstream state there is nothing to physically harm in the downstream 
state.  In other words, the consumption of the resource in one country does 
not destroy or damage the downstream state beyond interfering with its 
opportunity to also exploit that resource.  
The effects of transboundary harms were also the subject of a famous 
dispute between Argentina and Uruguay.91  In the Case Concerning Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay, Argentina filed a complaint with the 
International Court of Justice alleging that the construction of pulp mills in 
Uruguay along a border river was producing pollution in unreasonable 
amounts, and therefore harming Argentine waterways.92  Furthermore, 
Argentina alleged that it was not properly notified by Uruguay pursuant to an 
international agreement.93  The court ultimately noted that Argentina did not 
submit sufficient evidence demonstrating that Uruguay failed to employ the 
best available practices in attempting to mitigate any environmental harm.94  
However, the most important conclusion of the court involved the 
requirement to properly notify countries that would be potentially affected.  
Although Argentina was not a party to the agreement it cited in an attempt to 
require Uruguay to take additional steps to reduce pollutants, the court 
recognized an obligation to inform and notify affected states when actions 
are taken that will foreseeably result in transboundary harms.95  
The court also discussed the importance of conducting environmental 
assessments before beginning an activity that may result in transboundary 
                                                                                                                   
 90 Jutta Brunnée, The United States and International Environmental Law: Living With an 
Elephant, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 617, 628 (2004). 
 91 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20).  
 92 Id. at 25–26. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 74–75. 
 95 Id. at 59–61. 
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harm.96  The importance of environmental assessments should not be 
minimized.  In the context of tarpon management, an environmental 
assessment would account for where fish are harvested, at what stage in the 
life cycle the harvesting typically occurs, and the ramifications of harvest on 
both the gene pool and population levels.97  Requiring a nation to conduct an 
environmental assessment before undertaking to develop a new industry 
effectively promulgates levels of information that would allow for more 
informed decision-making.98 
This particular transboundary harm arises as a combination of fisheries 
management and protection of the interests of private citizens.  Fish are not 
aware of international borders, and thus travel without concern for 
regulations in one state as opposed to another.  Policies that promote 
harvesting fish in an upstream state undermine industries dependent on those 
fish in downstream states.99  For example, if tarpon are caught for their roe in 
Mexico, they are permanently removed from the population available to the 
sport fishing industry in the United States.100  The disappearance of those 
fish would clearly have a negative impact on the United States sport fishing 
industry, which happens to be downstream in the tarpon migration pattern.101  
Tarpon in that instance are merely a specific example illustrative of a larger 
problem.  The question remains, how can countries legislate, or refrain from 
legislating, in a manner that maximizes the benefit of these migratory species 
of fish to each country without making a certain country less well off.102 
                                                                                                                   
 96 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uruguay), 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20), at 59–60. 
 97 See Tarpon Research, BONEFISH & TARPON TRUST (2013), http://www.bonefishtarpon 
trust.org/tarpon-research/tarpon-research.html (describing conditions that affect the overall 
health of tarpon populations and development). 
 98 HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 70, at 498. 
 99 See, e.g., Tarpon Genetics Program, BONEFISH & TARPON TRUST, https://www.bonefish 
tarpontrust.org/tarpon-genetics-program/tarpon-genetics-program.html (discussing tarpon as 
potentially part of a single population such that fish that are harvested by Latin American 
countries may directly affect the size of the population available for the rest of the region). 
 100 Tarpon Research, supra note 97. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Efficiency, Pareto, and Kaldor-Hicks, 
LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Jan. 25, 2009), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/01/legal-
theory-lexicon-efficiency-pareto-and-kaldorhicks.html (explaining Pareto efficiency versus 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to urge resource allocation efficiency in regulation). 
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3.  A Coasian Approach? 
Another potential solution to fisheries management problems may be 
found in the application of the Coase Theorem.  Many take Coase’s famous 
theorem to suggest that legal rules are unimportant since parties can 
effectively bargain around the rules as they see fit.103  However, in the real 
world, transaction costs pose significant obstacles for negotiations between 
parties.104  Coase’s reasoning can also be understood as recognizing the 
articulation of a dynamic standard.105  Coase was not foolish enough to 
simply ignore the existence of transaction costs.  On the contrary, the Coase 
Theorem implicitly acknowledges a dynamic relationship between the 
creation of legal rules and the potential to bargain effectively.106  As 
transaction costs rise, the bargaining process breaks down, requiring the 
implementation of an effective legal rule.107  Where transaction costs are low, 
a legal rule merely serves as an impetus to get interested parties into the 
same room and working towards a solution.108  
In the context of managing migratory fish populations, the Coase 
Theorem would suggest that the more important question is whether or not 
states should attempt to regulate or negotiate around this problem.  Perhaps 
that question is even better structured as deciding whether the industries 
affected in downstream states should attempt to bargain an efficient outcome 
with actors in upstream states. 
4.  Summary 
On the whole, there are several different conceptual strategies that guide 
efforts to sustainably manage fish populations.  The first set of strategies 
classifies the problem as a tragedy of the commons and then addresses the 
                                                                                                                   
 103 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (describing how the 
establishment of a property rule or a liability rule in favor of one party does not foreclose the 
other party from bargaining to a more efficient resolution of the problem). 
 104 Timothy B. Lee, The Coase Theorem Is Widely Cited In Economics.  Ronald Coase 
Hated It, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
wonkblog/wp/2013/09/04/the-coase-theorem-is-widely-cited-in-economics-ronald-coase-hate 
d-it/. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
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different characteristics that create a tragedy of the commons.  Those 
characteristics include: lack of an ownership incentive to maintain the 
commons, the finite nature of resources in a commons, and finally the lack of 
governance over common resources.  To combat the problems these 
characteristics pose, regulations can divide the commons into individual 
parcels, attempt to increase the pool of commons resources, or institute rules 
for the commons via exclusion or societal pressures on responsible use.  
The second set of strategies address the international nature of the issues 
attached to managing tarpon.  Because these fish migrate across boundaries, 
the actions of one state to regulate the fishery can affect other states 
negatively.  International law has developed rational methods to mitigate 
these types of transboundary harms. 
The final major strategy identifies the problem as one of transaction costs.  
For instance, stakeholders should be able to get together and debate 
appropriate use of the fishery.  However, because the transaction costs of 
attempting that solution are so high, rules need to be instituted to force the 
bargaining to take place.  All of these strategies are different routes that seek 
to arrive at the same destination: the successful management of a healthy 
fishery that incorporates relevant stakeholder concerns. 
B.  Current Regulatory Schemes in Place to Manage Tarpon Fisheries 
1.  Domestic Efforts 
By contributing to the stabilization of population levels, game fish 
protection has helped sustain the growth of what has become a robust sport-
fishing industry for several fish species.109  In the United States, tarpon are 
protected as game fish in a few states, however legislation has not been 
enacted at the federal level.110  Protected game fish may still be chased, 
casted at, caught, and kept; the important part of protection afforded by 
federal game fish status is that the fish may not be commercially 
                                                                                                                   
 109 See, e.g., Federal Government Confirms Red Drum and Striped Bass Gamefish Status, 
AMERICAN SPORTFISHING ASS’N (Oct. 17, 2008), http://asafishing.org/newsroom/news-release 
s/federal-government-confirms-red-drum-and-striped-bass-gamefish-status/ (noting that 
gamefish status for these species “insures the recreational, economic, and environmental 
benefits of two of the most popular gamefish in the United States”). 
 110 See CCA National Accomplishments, COASTAL CONSERVATION ASS’N MISSISSIPPI, 
https://www.cca.ms/about-cca/national-accomplishments/ (listing regulations attaining game 
fish status for tarpon in certain states). 
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harvested.111  When discussing the game fishing industry that has developed 
around tarpon in the United States, it is important to remember that this 
fishing is not aimed at catching tarpon for private or public consumption.  
Therefore, for game fish status to provide substantial protection, it should 
include a ban on recreational harvest as well.112  
Since tarpon have not yet been federally protected in the United States, 
the management of tarpon is left to each individual state.  However, 
individual state regulations vary widely. Florida designated tarpon as a 
“catch-and-release only” species in 2013.113  Several other states have 
adopted minimum size requirements for harvesting tarpon.114  Louisiana 
represents the opposite end of the United States’ regulatory spectrum, as they 
have consistently refused to regulate the tarpon fishery in any way.115  
Currently, there is an effort by non-governmental organizations in the United 
States to engage in a state-by-state push to declare tarpon a game fish.116 
In addition to campaigning for each state to enact statutes or regulations 
protecting tarpon, current domestic efforts represent a concentrated push for 
the federal government to recognize tarpon as a game fish.  Federal 
recognition should incentivize the states to manage the tarpon in their waters 
according to the requirements of the federal government, which could 
include catch and release only status.  A federal ban on harvest would need 
to be implemented at the state level, encouraging the states to cooperate with 
federal fisheries managers to ensure state and federal regulations protect this 
important fishery.117  Federal game fish status could also potentially provide 
leverage for the United States to work with neighboring countries to institute 
a regional management plan for tarpon.118  
                                                                                                                   
 111 See Federal Government Confirms Red Drum and Striped Bass Gamefish Status, supra 
note 109 (explaining the meaning of federal game fish status and how that status affects red 
drum and striped bass). 
 112 Adams et al., supra note 5 (stating that tarpon were recreationally harvested even after 
achieving gamefish status). 
 113 FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 68B-32.004 (2013). 
 114 Fishing Regulations List, BONEFISH & TARPON TR., http://www.bonefishtarpontrust.org/ 
general/fishing-regulations-list.html. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Tarpon Federal Gamefish Initiative, supra note 32, at 40–41. 
 118 Id. 
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2.  International Protections 
Currently UNCLOS Article 64 and Annex 1 govern the regulation of 
migratory fish populations.119  All of the major states bordering the Gulf of 
Mexico that are impacted by the migration of tarpon have, at a minimum, 
ratified the portion of UNCLOS covering both straddling stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks.120  The pertinent provision of Article 64 provides that 
states must “cooperate directly or through appropriate international 
organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the 
objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the region.”121 
Article 64 does not itself explicitly define what classifies a species as a 
“highly migratory.”122  Instead, Annex 1 to UNLCOS simply lists several 
species of fish that are highly migratory.123  Tarpon are not among the 
species listed as highly migratory.124  Therefore, since the textual provisions 
of the treaty do not include tarpon, the obligations contained in Article 64 
arguably do not apply to these fish.  
Article 64 is part of the broader provision in UNCLOS establishing 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).125  States have exclusive rights to exploit 
the living resources within 200 miles of their coastlines according to Articles 
56 and 57 of UNCLOS.126  UNCLOS also creates an obligation for states to 
“promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources” found 
within the states’ EEZ.127  Therefore, while tarpon may not be specifically 
covered in the highly migratory species provisions of UNCLOS, they 
arguably would fall under the more general requirements so that they, as a 
resource, must be “optimally utilized.”128  Therein lies the problem: because 
tarpon are not harvested on a large-scale commercial basis, the fish are 
largely ignored in overarching regulatory regimes aimed at sustainable use 
and management of fisheries.  However, simply because these fish are not 
                                                                                                                   
 119 UNCLOS, supra note 69, art. 64. 
 120 United Nations: Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of 
Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements 
(Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological _lists_of_ratificatio 
ns.htm. 
 121 UNCLOS, supra note 69, art. 64. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. arts. 56(1)(a), 57. 
 127 Id. art. 62(1). 
 128 Id. 
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vacuumed from the seas does not mean the fishery is not imperiled by other 
sources.  Additionally, there is not a clear understanding of what exactly 
“promoting optimum use” requires of states.  This is not a problem unique to 
tarpon.  UNCLOS has been criticized for its lack of concrete obligations, 
especially in regards to safeguarding and managing living resources.129  
Thus, relying on UNCLOS to regulate the tarpon fishery in a sustainable 
manner seems to be misguided. 
Furthermore, each country’s individual regulations regarding tarpon are 
little better than the current international framework.130  The legal regimes 
specifically governing the harvest of tarpon in each nation through which 
tarpon migrate are patchwork at best.131  Similar to the current situation in 
the United States, these individual countries also lack sufficient regulation at 
the federal level.  For example, Mexico does not regulate the tarpon fishery 
in any way other than to impose a “two per person per day” rule.132  Belize 
has adopted “catch-and-release” status for tarpon, but these regulations are 
not stringently enforced.133  Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands 
all currently have regulations in place maintaining that tarpon are catch-and-
release only.134  However, these states seem to be either unwilling or unable 
to effectively enforce those regulations that are in place.  Many other states 
throughout the greater Caribbean, including the Bahamas, do not have 
regulations addressing tarpon; those regulations that do exist are simply not 
adequate to effectively sustain populations of tarpon.135 
IV.  REFRAMING THE PROBLEM 
The migratory nature of tarpon contributes to many of the problems these 
fish face.  Tarpon migrate in long chains, often hundreds of fish long.  These 
chains seem to flow through the shallow emerald waters much like a river 
through the ocean.  Harm to the population occurring in one part of the globe 
affects the viability of tarpon populations along the entire migration route.  
Perhaps principles gleaned from customary international law or agreements 
                                                                                                                   
 129 See Robert Beckman & Tara Davenport, The EEZ Regime: Reflections after 30 Years, in 
LOSI CONFERENCE PAPERS 2012, at 31 (Harry N. Scheiber & Moon Sang Kwon eds., 2012), 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Beckman-Davenport-final.pdf. 
 130 Fishing Regulations List, supra note 114. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Telephone Interview with Dr. Aaron Adams, supra note 18. 
 134 Fishing Regulations List, supra note 114. 
 135 Id. 
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governing rivers can provide an enlightening perspective from which a 
model to protect tarpon can be derived. 
A.  International Riparian Rights 
River systems have been fairly recent subjects of substantial international 
disputes.  Generally, water law seeks to allocate risk.136  An additional 
foundational premise to water law is that all states whose territory is adjacent 
to a body of water have a right to make reasonable use of the water located 
within their territory.137  Thus, all states typically agree that only those states 
with territory bordering rivers or through which a river flows have any legal 
claim to an apportionment of the water flowing across or along their 
territory.138  The main area of concern with water rights aims to ensure that a 
river’s rate of flow is maintained throughout the course of the waterway.139  
Upstream states usually argue for “absolute territorial sovereignty” 
principles, which dictate that states should have complete dominion over the 
resources passing through their territories.140  On the other hand, downstream 
states typically advocate for the “absolute integrity of the watercourse,” 
which requires both the river’s quantity and quality of water flow remain 
unaltered throughout its course.141  However, neither of these absolutist 
approaches typically carry the day.  Instead, optimal allocation and use of the 
available water resources requires coordination among all of the actors 
seeking to affect the flow of water.  The major legal doctrines that have 
developed to help countries solve disputes over how much an individual state 
may restrict the flow of international rivers have evolved from 
straightforward equitable apportionment, coupled with “do no harm” and 
“prior notice” principles, to basin-wide management. 
                                                                                                                   
 136 A. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global 
Climate Change, 15 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 423, 428 (2000), reprinted in 15 J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 423, 428 (2008). 
 137 Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Customary International Law of Transboundary Fresh 
Waters, 1 INT. J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 264, 269–73, 276–87 (2001). 
 138 Id. at 269. 
 139 A. Dan Tarlock, Four Challenges for International Water Law, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 369, 
372, 374–75 (2010). 
 140 Id. at 373 n.11, 375 n.26.  
 141 Dellapenna, supra note 137, at 269. 
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1.  Equitable Apportionment 
The doctrine of equitable apportionment evolved to address the demands 
of upstream states for absolute territorial sovereignty.  The doctrine 
essentially splits the baby between upstream states and downstream states, 
declaring that “upstream states do not have an absolute right to control and 
use all the water that originates in their territories.”142  Further, “downstream 
states do not have the corresponding right to block upstream development by 
demanding the unimpeded flow of a river into their territories.”143  Put 
simply, fairness concerns dictate the ultimate result that “no riparian state 
should be able to unilaterally preclude other states from using their fair share 
of an international river.”144  This is a logical resolution to the water usage 
demands of upstream and downstream states.  Neither can have an 
unimpeded flow at the other’s expense; therefore, the right to use water must 
somehow be fairly allocated amongst the interested nations. 
The doctrine of equitable apportionment derives its modern formulation 
from a combination of the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence,145 the 
Helsinki Rules, their modern reformulation—the Berlin Rules, and the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercoures (Watercourses Convention).146  The Watercourses 
Convention entered into force in 2014 and focuses on fostering global 
cooperation in the use of transboundary water resources.147  The 
Watercourses Convention is commonly regarded as a proper attempt at 
codifying customary international law.148  Even the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has stepped in to defend equitable apportionment’s status as 
customary international law.149  
In light of its widespread support, equitable apportionment has become 
the international norm in determining water rights entitlements.150  Perhaps 
                                                                                                                   
 142 Tarlock, supra note 139, at 375. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Dellapenna, supra note 137, at 276. 
 146 Tarlock, supra note 139, at 376. 
 147 United Nations Watercourses Convention Enters Into Force, UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 18, 
2014), http://www.unwatercoursesconvention.org/news/united-nations-watercourses-convent 
ion-enters-into-force/. 
 148 Tarlock, supra note 139, at 376. 
 149 Id. at 377. 
 150 A. Dan Tarlock & Patricia Wouters, Are Shared Benefits of International Waters an 
Equitable Apportionment?, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 523, 524 (2007). 
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the most important component of the principle of equitable apportionment, as 
an organizing approach to assigning water rights, is a strenuous objection to 
the practice of an upstream or downstream state unilaterally damming or 
diverting a river’s flow.151  The modern development of the doctrine seeks to 
address concerns over singular state action.  Evidence of the doctrine’s 
growth can be found in the growing tide of scholars who argue that the focus 
of equitable apportionment should shift from strictly dividing the existing 
water-quantity resources towards a more holistic allocation of the overall 
benefits received.152 
Since unilateral action on the part of either an upstream or downstream 
riparian state is typically discouraged, states must attempt to cooperate in 
order to develop a system that apportions rights to river flows fairly between 
the parties.153  Equitable apportionment can take at least two forms in 
encouraging cooperation among states.  The first form of equitable 
apportionment, classic, considers only states whose watersheds contribute to 
the river basin.154  Classic equitable apportionment would only account for 
those countries with an interest in the riparian rights; therefore, the equitable 
apportionment would be a simple and straightforward division of the water 
between the interested basin parties.155 
The other formulation of equitable apportionment, shared benefits, forces 
states to consider the overall output of the riparian system.156  States must 
take into account a number of factors, including economic savings from the 
allocation of rights to dam the river, to determine the overall level of benefit 
provided by the waterway.157  In practice, states are typically compensated 
with money for waiving their claims to the use and control of water.158  The 
shared benefits approach requires basin-wide management of transboundary 
                                                                                                                   
 151 Id. at 524–25. 
 152 Id. at 527. 
 153 But see Tarlock, supra note 139, at 376–78 (discussing how the real world practice of 
equitable apportionment has been only a minimal success); Dellapenna, supra note 137, at 376 
(arguing that while an accepted principle of international law, equitable apportionment 
typically fails without strong institutional monitoring). 
 154 Scott O. McKenzie, Note, Egypt’s Choice: From the Nile Basin Treaty to the 
Cooperative Framework Agreement, an International Legal Analysis, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
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rivers through cooperation among all states.159  The most successful example 
of a treaty that adopted the shared benefits approach to equitable 
apportionment is the agreement between the United States and Canada 
regarding the Columbia River Basin.160  Part of the treaty’s success story is 
its demonstration of the positive results of cooperation in management of the 
river. 
Additionally, the “do no harm” principle of customary international law 
has helped animate the concept of transboundary river management, 
especially when considering the justifications for imposing a system based 
on equitable apportionment.  “Do no harm” means exactly what it says: that 
states should act in a way that does not harm co-riparian states.161  An 
important corollary to “do no harm” is the timely notification principle, 
which calls for adequate notice of riparian developments in a timely 
manner.162  If given proper notice and time to prepare, modern engineering 
can allow river managers to prevent some harm from occurring.163  
The Trail Smelter Arbitration remains as perhaps the best applicable 
illustration of the “do no harm” principle. As examined earlier, this 
proceeding incorporated the concept that states should act in a way that 
avoids harming the interests of other states.164  In fact, the arbitrator relied on 
the logic of United States water law to justify its method of addressing 
transboundary pollution.165  The holding in Trail Smelter was then 
incorporated into a number of international treaties, most notably being 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration in 1972.166  In the same manner, 
the principle of timely notification has received widespread support 
throughout international law.  For example, the Watercourses Convention 
provides that “[b]efore undertaking a major development, the moving state 
must give ‘timely notification’ to other affected states.”167 
                                                                                                                   
 159 Id. at 397–402 (describing examples of successful and unsuccessful basin-wide 
management). 
 160 McKenzie, supra note 154, at 592. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 593. 
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 164 Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941). 
 165 Meredith A. Giordano, Managing the Quality of International Rivers: Global Principles 
and Basin Practice, 43 NAT. RES. J. 111, 115 (2003), available at http://lawschool.unm.edu/ 
nrj/volumes/43/1/05_giordono_quality.pdf. 
 166 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5–16, 
1972, Declaration on the Human Environment, princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14. 
 167 Tarlock, supra note 139, at 405. 
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2.  Basin-Wide Management 
A different concept developing in international water law is the idea of 
basin-wide management of the waterway.  In a basin-wide approach, 
individual sovereignty of the involved states is limited and therefore 
unilateral action is theoretically constrained.168  Basin-wide management 
seeks to reflect the natural state of a river basin as a single ecological 
system.169  This approach appeals to the principles described above while 
recognizing that there is an inherent community of interests among riparian 
states that practically demands a unified approach.170  Article 8 of the 
Watercourses Convention recognizes and adopts the principle of basin-wide 
management.171 
These concepts have come to a head in a few important international 
disputes.  The management of the Nile River in Africa is one such important 
dispute because it exhibits the potential benefits from a shared benefits 
regime as well as the problems implementing such a system.172  The Nile is 
one of the most stressed rivers in the world, as it has been dammed since the 
1950s to provide hydroelectric power and irrigation for crops in the river 
delta.173  Egypt has, in practice, had complete legal and political control over 
development on the upstream portion of the Nile.174  The Nile Basin 
Initiative aimed to disrupt Egypt’s stranglehold on the Nile’s resources by 
constructing smaller dams throughout the watershed.175  However, those 
projects have caused even further environmental problems as well as serious 
social concerns.176  
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B.  International Riparian Rights Applied to Tarpon 
Tarpon are but one example of a transboundary resource.177  In the same 
manner that migratory species of fish in oceanic waters flow through 
political boundaries, an international river can traverse political boundaries 
along the course of its flow.  International states often owe specific duties to 
neighboring states into which their rivers flow as a matter of customary 
international law.178  However, recent treaties have attempted to codify 
customary international law into imposing definite methods to manage the 
flows of international rivers.  Therefore, by analogizing the current state of 
international water rights with the need for adequate protection for tarpon, a 
similar regulatory framework may be used to address the concerns of 
migratory fisheries management. 
Since migratory populations of fish are merely movements of a resource, 
much like transboundary rivers, a regulatory regime that effectively manages 
movement of water across international boundaries could be applied to the 
movement of fish.  If fish follow relatively standard migration patterns, 
devising a regulatory scheme around the same principles that undergird 
international water rights law should address some of the traditional 
problems associated with fisheries management that would also theoretically 
resolve the problems currently facing the tarpon fishery. 
In attempting to craft a legal framework that adequately addresses and 
mitigates the aspects of migratory fisheries regulation that resemble a 
tragedy of the commons, the most preferable solution would be to encourage 
cooperation among nations through which these fish migrate.  This can be 
accomplished at the international level by encouraging behavior with state 
regulation; in other words, using societal pressures and norms to enforce 
legislation that may otherwise be unenforceable.179  Such a regime would 
potentially reduce costs of enforcement, as the interested parties would 
                                                                                                                   
 177 See Cyrille de Klemm, The Problem of Migratory Species in International Law, GREEN 
GLOBE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
(1994), available at http://www.fni.no/ybiced/94_05_klemm.pdf (listing other marine species 
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species such as some species of salmon or sturgeon, catadromous species like eels, and also 
discussing highly migratory species like tuna which are capable of covering considerable 
distances on the open seas). 
 178 HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, supra note 70, at 842–88. 
 179 See Tarpon Federal Gamefish Initiative, supra note 32, at 40–41 (arguing that federal 
game fish status for tarpon in the United States could effectively exert pressure on other states 
in the region to take similar measures in safeguarding the tarpon). 
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recognize the benefits of working together.180  By cooperating to reduce 
enforcement costs, each member state could theoretically benefit from the 
efforts of the other states, thus maximizing the overall gains.181  
Regarding the management of tarpon in the Gulf of Mexico, the number 
of states with direct impact on the fishery is relatively small.  The United 
States would need to be involved in any international cooperation 
agreements and would most likely be joined by at least Mexico and Belize.  
If scientific research were to show that tarpon migration patterns occur over 
much longer distances, or perhaps that some tarpon do traverse the Gulf of 
Mexico directly, then obviously more countries would need to be included in 
the management of the fishery.  This would indicate that proposing a 
bilateral, or a regionally focused multilateral agreement, could coordinate 
regulation to standardize the treatment of the tarpon fishery throughout the 
Gulf. 
The doctrine of equitable apportionment provides an excellent starting 
place for analogizing the regime currently in place for transboundary riparian 
rights to the movement of migratory fish species across different states’ 
waters.  Just as upstream states in a river system do not have an absolute 
right to unilaterally control and use the water from that river, neither should 
upstream states in a migratory pattern have exclusive rights to the fish that 
swim through their territorial waters.  The same foundational policy concerns 
support both arguments.  It would be fundamentally unfair to modify the 
flow of a resource so as to preclude downstream states’ significant access to 
that resource.  The converse to the argument is also true.  Again, due to 
fairness concerns dictate that downstream states are not entitled to the 
unimpeded, natural flow of a resource.  A downstream state should not be 
able to totally preclude an upstream state from utilizing resources within that 
state’s own borders.  The question then transforms into the following: since 
neither party has the right to ultimate control of the resource, what level of 
apportionment between states is appropriate and fair? 
Accepting that the equitable apportionment doctrine provides adequate 
justification for attempting to impose obligations on both upstream and 
downstream states in migratory populations of fish, there then are multiple 
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prospective models for attempting to address the challenges of fairly 
regulating such a fishery.  The first of which is to simply leave the status quo 
intact.  However, suggesting this strategy would adequately protect the long-
term health of the fishery seems to be wishful thinking at best.  The lack of 
regulation has already resulted in the decline of tarpon populations 
throughout the region.  Taking no action, but hoping for conditions to 
improve seems contradictory and illogical.  Indeed, those that have been 
most affected have already seen fit to attempt to regulate the fishery.182  
Another approach is to adopt a regulatory scheme consistent with the 
classic version of equitable apportionment.  In that model, only those states 
with a direct interest in the resource should be allowed input in deciding how 
access to that resource is allocated.  This type of regime could function as a 
quota system where each affected state is apportioned a number of tarpon it 
is allowed to harvest.  However, there is no absolute requirement for the 
system to implement a property right.  As noted earlier, mere property rights 
can often exacerbate the problems associated with sustainably managing a 
fishery. 
Instead, perhaps a more effective solution would be to consider the 
allocation of the benefits of accessing the resource.  For example, in the 
context of riparian systems, the typical question is who is allowed to dam or 
divert the flow of a river.  What that question is essentially asking is who is 
allowed to profit from the resource.  In the same manner, profiting from the 
resource of tarpon need not be confined to the exclusive right to harvest the 
fish.  Instead, a profit from the resource of a migratory fish could be 
construed to simply be the rights to extract benefits from the fishery.  Such a 
benefit could be negotiated to require scientific research to be conducted in 
the most upstream state, perhaps even dividing up the rights to conduct 
research based on the life cycle of the fish, with certain stages of life studied 
in certain phases of the fish’s movement. 
Such an approach, bargaining for an equitable apportionment among 
directly interested parties, need not be limited to governmental actors.  For 
instance, allowing United States non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
interested in preserving the overall health of the tarpon population to bargain 
with individuals in other countries who are more interested in developing 
estuaries could result in a favorable outcome for both groups without the 
need for burdensome costs on the government.  This approach would also be 
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consistent with the Coase Theorem but would avoid the implementation of a 
possibly unwieldy regulatory regime.  
Yet another option would be to adopt a multiparty, basin-wide approach 
in line with the shared benefits doctrine discussed above.  This approach 
addresses the general concerns of fisheries management as a collective action 
problem, while also taking full advantage of already developed international 
conventions that benefit the tarpon population.  Additionally, the strategy 
potentially provides a benefit to growing industries in all the affected states.  
A basin-wide approach should by necessity involve all stakeholders, 
including NGOs already thoroughly invested in the fishery.  Such an 
approach would need to primarily address the concerns with habitat 
destruction, including both the destruction of mangrove habitats and the 
alteration of freshwater flows into estuaries, while also taking appropriate 
measures to ensure that the fishery is not commercially over-exploited.  This 
approach should also involve regulating the type of equipment that can be 
used to catch tarpon.183  
In addition, the basin-wide approach would need to comport with the 
shared benefits approach.  This type of approach typically results in 
economic compensation in return for foregoing use of the resource in an 
upstream state.  This could take the form of a subsidy, if, for instance, the 
United States government decided to simply pay other countries to refrain 
from harvesting tarpon, destroying juvenile habitats, or otherwise negatively 
impacting the fishery.  The revenue to pay for such a subsidy could be 
generated by the sport fishing industry.  Perhaps simply imposing a small fee 
on fishing licenses in downstream states could generate the total payment.  
Theoretically, as the tarpon population expands, opportunities should rise to 
catch these fish.  Assuming demand for tarpon as a trophy fish remains 
constant, and that current demand outpaces the availability of guides, more 
guides could enter the industry to capitalize on the increased opportunities to 
catch tarpon.  These increases in numbers of anglers, guides, fishing licenses, 
boats, and gas purchases, not to mention other incidental benefits associated 
with traveling to catch a prized game fish, should provide a boon to 
economies serving the industry. 
In deciding what to regulate and how to craft regulations to meet those 
goals, conducting an environmental assessment would be useful because the 
assessments can focus on preventing transboundary harms.  Risk assessments 
also need to be scientifically based, which would then incorporate the 
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opportunity for further scientific research regarding the current health of the 
tarpon population while simultaneously providing valuable baseline data.  
An accurate environmental assessment also allows all the interested states to 
evaluate the status quo as compared to the proposed changes.  
However, conducting an environmental assessment in this instance would 
be a novel departure from current international norms.  First, this 
environmental assessment would have to focus on determining the impact of 
potential regulation, rather than the effects of a specific project or 
development.  Second, this environmental assessment would not necessarily 
aim at identifying transboundary harm, because the particular harms have not 
occurred.  Rather, the assessment would seek to highlight the benefits of 
preventing these harms from occurring.  The adoption of a new approach to 
conducting an environmental assessment is questionable.  Yet such use of an 
environmental assessment could be analogized to the current use as both are 
aimed at prospectively mitigating harms from a currently planned course of 
action. 
After conducting an environmental assessment to provide scientifically 
verifiable data on the greatest impacts to the tarpon fishery, the multi-party, 
basin-wide approach would need to address the obstacles of effectively 
establishing meaningful regulations.  For instance, there would 
understandably be enforcement problems and additional monitoring costs 
that could be overly burdensome to some states.  However, these costs could 
be lessened by further incorporating the current approaches to managing 
transboundary rivers.  
The United States could lend its scientific expertise to countries with 
limited resources in exchange for their monitoring and enforcement of these 
provisions.  The United States could also provide monetary compensation for 
refraining from destroying mangrove habitats.  Such additional compensation 
would seek to provide incentives for these developing countries to comply 
with the basin-wide approach.  Furthermore, it makes logical sense for the 
United States to exercise its comparative technological advantage in such a 
way, as the United States currently has the largest game fishing industry, in 
the Gulf of Mexico at least, to protect. Information could then be shared with 
stakeholders in order to promote the most scientifically effective 
conservation efforts.  
Additionally, downstream states could assert the do no harm and timely 
notification principles to provide incentives for upstream states to refrain 
from moving forward with plans that disrupt the habitat of juvenile tarpon.  
By insisting that these principles of customary international law be adhered 
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to, downstream states could potentially increase the costs of developing areas 
with dense growth of mangroves to the point where upstream states would 
not profit from their development.  
There are multiple opportunities for states to draw upon the salient 
principles of international water law in order to more effectively regulate 
migratory species of fish.  Both equitable apportionment regimes simply seek 
to allocate the benefit of a flowing resource among parties that either directly 
access the resource, or collectively share in the benefit.  By apportioning the 
benefit among these parties in an appropriate manner, states can benefit from 
agreeing to sustainably manage the fishery. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Tarpon are a unique species of fish and as such they pose unique 
challenges when faced with the stark realities of conservation efforts.  If 
tarpon are not properly conserved, it is foreseeable that population levels will 
continue to decline, potentially eliminating a $6 billion industry.  In order to 
prevent catastrophe, a framework based on measures used to apportion 
manageable flows of international waterways could be feasibly implemented 
to protect their habitat and encourage the use of appropriate tackle when 
fishing for tarpon, while also discouraging their commercial or frequent 
recreational harvest.  Such a measure would safeguard not only a precious 
natural resource, but also a burgeoning industry throughout the greater 
Caribbean and western Atlantic. 
  
